The Taiwan Question
Well, as many of the Ministers have already hypothesized, it is quite possible that a Crisis may occur with regards to Taiwan. I want to bring up the foreign relations focus of a conflict with Taiwan, with an emphasis on the United States.
We know that the USA is a strong (if not the only) backer of the status-quo for Mainland-Taiwan relations. While the US and China did sign the Shanghai Communique in 1972 (one year after the US allowed China into the Security Council) that agreed on the “One China” principle, there has always been strong friction between the US and China on the point of Taiwan.
One problematic feature is the Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic US law which stipulates that the US is obligated to sell arms to Taiwan and to possibly defend it if necessary. While the TRA is definitely more dilute than the original Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (1954), it still means that the US has a vested interest in the security of Taiwan. Some analysts believe that the TRA will “force” the US to engage in a conflict with China over Taiwan, even if the US is hesitant to do so. Others hold that the US is fully capable of ignoring its own laws under realistic terms.
On China’s part, in March 2005, the Anti-Succession Law was passed, which pretty much served as a line in the sand regarding Taiwan. So, if Taiwan made certain moves towards independence, or exhausted all the options of reunification, China would be legally obligated to invade. Once again, like the TRA, analysts are conflicted over the actual willingness to enforce the Anti-Succession Law.
As Ministers, your task will be to carefully decide on what to do in case of a conflict over Taiwan. Firstly, what is China willing to pay in order to keep the renegade province? Secondly, what are the most successful strategies (diplomatic, military, and otherwise) to pursue Taiwan? Thirdly, how might India and Pakistan use this conflict to their own advantages?
March 11th, 2008 at 3:49 pm
The Chinese stance if a crisis like this were to occur is, for better or worse, strikingly clear to the cabinet. Coupled with international promise, the Anti-Seccession Law is the cornerstone of the new One-China policy. I’m personally not too worried about garnering support for our cause at all if this inevitable crisis were to come up during the conference. China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is China, and the majority of the international community (pretty much all but 25 countries who insist on recognizing Taiwan and disregarding their relations with the Chinese) either understands that or knows better than to question it for the sake of their own political relationships.
While the Anti-Seccession Law makes clear the Chinese military action that would take place in a (in my opinion, rash under the present circumstances) Taiwanese declaration of independence, it would be in the best interest of the Chinese to pursue bilateral negotiations (bilateral in the sense that there are two participating parties of course; not implying that Taiwan would become a state following forementioned so-called “independence”). The Chinese reputation on the world stage, which it will undoubtedly become the star of in this situation, is important - while support will not be hard to find, China still must maintain the backing of the international community and especially the Security Council. Not only would pursuing negotiations (even if ill-fated) illustrate an ideal “peaceful rise” by China, but these talks would shed laudability on an otherwise misunderstood Chinese policy. Such negotiations must happen simultaneously along military mobilization, of course.
The relationship between China and the United States in preventing a conflict like this is tumultuous at best. While the Politburo knows they are bound by their own piece of legislation to carry out military action in the event of Taiwanese independence, they will do their best to prevent a war in the Formosa Strait. Likewise, American diplomats will do their best to prevent a pre-declared notion that military, political, and financial aid will be entering the Formosa in the same event. In this regard, it’s solely up to the United States to quell rash Taiwanese declarations of independence, as the outcome will be unpleasant for all parties involved.
To make matters worse, the growing population and new generation of Chinese are becoming less and less enamoured with the prospect of the struggle for “One-China.” Unless the Chinese government supresses the movement once and for all, its younger citizens may not understand the importance of keeping a province which represents the outdated ideas of the Second and Third Generations of Chinese politics, and eventually the Fourth and present.