Crisis Simulation

Of course time is a funny thing to play with. If you think about it, you never really can be on time, since you can always be an infinitesimally bit late.

In Crisis, we treat the concept of time specially, with two major changes:

1. Scaling Time- If Crisis were completely run in “real time” (where one minute in our committee equals one minute in the real world), things would be rather dull. That’s because in the real world programs and orders take tons of time to implement. Imagine coming to Crisis, issuing an order to run an investigation, and then waiting three months for a result! Naturally we will at times “speed things up”, so that we can quickly deal with the results of what is going on. Your Chairs will notify you when a day or week changes, and the Crisis documents will reflect the adjusted time.
2. Reality Cut-Off Date- There’s a certain point where real life will end, and Crisis life will take over. This is in part due to our preparations that we complete before hand, and that we need an extra bit of time to paint the perfect background for our Crisis weekend. So when we announce it (and the cut-off date is most likely going to be in the later portion of February), you don’t have to pay attention to what happens in the news. We will notify you of events that are happening after February, and we’ll just all assume that nothing else has happened.

If there are any questions as to this funny time thing, post a comment!

*These articles on Political Theory are completely optional and are not required reading. However, knowledge of the theories may be useful for your own intellectual pursuits. Think of the articles as a synopsis of an entire college semester, free of tuition and expensive books.*

While you may hear about many of the things that UC Berkeley is excellent at, teaching military policy sadly isn’t quite good here. This is largely because of our particularly (and sometimes irrationally) liberal persuasion, which decides that studying the military is a lost cause. This of course is a rather stupid line of reasoning, because even if we strongly dislike something, that’s no excuse to ignore a study of it (for example, Fascism, economic depression, various diseases).

Luckily, there’s a smattering of individuals in BMUN who have firsthand experience with the military, and presumably military policy. Our Head Chair of UNODC was actually formerly from the Signal Corps of the US Army. We’re also proud to have our Head Chair of UNSC be an officer-in-training for the US Air Force military intelligence branch. Hopefully, we’ll be able to use their experiences to better learn about military affairs and operations.

From a political perspective, I can draw to your attention three aspects of military policy which most concern Political Scientists. These are capability, doctrine, and command and control. While these three categories are applicable to all sectors of the military, we’ll be reviewing them today in the context of strategic nuclear forces.

Capability pretty much means the maximum force that a country has at its disposal. Now, this doesn’t mean that a nation would realistically use 100% of its force for trivial purposes. Imagine it like a car. My car is capable of going as fast as 100 kmph. However, most of the time you won’t find me zooming around that quickly. A country’s nuclear capability can be determined by several things, such as long-range missile technology, warhead technology, manufacturing and mining infrastructure, and guidance systems. With the three states that we’re concerned with (China, India, and Pakistan), each of the three has at least strategic regional nuclear capabilities.

Doctrine is a country’s political plan to fight a war with particular weapons. So, going back to my car analogy, I may choose to stay under 100 kmph if I’m not late. But if I’m late, then I might go over 100 kmph. That would be my doctrine for deciding what to do and when to do it. Each state has its own doctrine when it comes to using nuclear weapons. For example, India has a “no first use” doctrine, which claims that it will not be the first one to deploy its nuclear weapons (but it still might retaliate if hit with nukes). China has a similar doctrine, except that it becomes fuzzy when Taiwan is considered (because nuking Taiwan wouldn’t legally be the same as striking a foreign country, as Taiwan is part of China). Note that doctrine can change pretty easily and quickly, while capability takes decades to build and research.

Command and Control refers to the operational systems that keep the weapons in check when they are not used. So in my car, I have to first push down the accelerator before I can zoom around, and it’s fairly certain that I won’t speed up unless I push down the pedal. This of course ensures that my driving record is clean and that accidents are minimal. This also applies to nuclear weapons (although at this point casualties from car accidents are many times higher than deaths from nuclear attack). Pakistan, given its military state, has a very rigid and defined command and control system, that prevents accidental firing of nuclear weapons (National Command Authority). India in comparison lacks such a clearly defined plan, mostly on account of the military’ role being minimized in comparison to civilian leadership (Nuclear Command Authority). Command and control systems are also what keep nukes out of terrorist hands.

Last year, in order to encourage blog participation, we offered extra credit for delegates who posted meaningful contributions to the blog.  As a result, not only were the scores of papers significantly improved, delegates also were able to take advantage of the information offered in the blogs.

One small problem was that some delegates were receiving exceptionally high grades on their papers, skewing our overall grading system (raising our average score and making other papers worse by comparison).  Naturally, we want to have a clear and accurate idea of where our delegates stand, and this mathematical anomoly interferes with that.

This year, the blog participation credit will be integrated into the grade for the position paper.  As is currently envisioned, it will be impossible for a delegate to receive an A (90+) for the paper unless they have also participated in the blog.  Posts on this blog, or any of the Cabinet blogs, that are of academic quality will count towards this section.

If you have any questions on this policy, please feel free to contact me.

-Eric

No doubt you’re all busily working on your papers, and you’re wondering what special criteria Crisis has for grading.

Firstly, I’m sure you’ll be saddened by the fact that I won’t be the one issuing final grades on your papers. While I will be reading each and every one of them (the ones we get on time at least), my Vice Chairs will be assigning grades by their own judgments. Already, Mr. Steenstrup has posted what he looks for on his Pakistani Cabinet Blog. I’m sure that in due time, other Chairs will post on their blogs if there is anything special they want you to take into account. And, as they’ll be the ones grading you, it’s probably an excellent idea to follow their instructions.

Secondly, Crisis overall looks for much more analysis (versus data) than other committees. This is because while facts are important, it’s much more suitable for a Crisis delegate to be able to quickly and accurately extrapolate conclusions from the facts, rather than spout off a lot of statistics. For example, this is data without analysis:

“According to certain sources, the population of single males in China is set to boom by 2010.”

While this may be interesting, it’s pretty meaningless unless analysis is added:

“This population imbalance may lead to significant changes in foreign policy, such as more bellicose and unrestrained foreign policy.”

Please include analysis in your papers (a ratio of 7:3, analysis to data, is a good rate).

Thirdly, if your Chairs for your cabinet do not give you specific guidelines, please follow the points below. Otherwise, go with their instructions over these:

• 1,500 word minimum. This is what we had to do for our topic synopses, and it feels fair to have you all do the same amount of work.
• 12 point, Times New Roman, double-spaced, 1 inch margins. Just so it’s easier for us to read.
• No cover page is required, but be sure to include your real name, your cabinet (China, India, or Pakistan), and your Minister position. Please do not put down your school, just so that we remain fair in our grading.
• Sources are mandatory, in whatever academic form and format you feel like.
• Please address the following: 1) Minister background and history, 2) Ministry/department background and history, 3) Current foreign issues faced by your country, 4) Current domestic issues faced by your country, 5) solutions to these issues.

The paper deadlines are: postmarked by February 1st for Research Award eligibility, or postmarked by March 1st for General Award eligibility. If for any reason you can’t make these deadlines, email me before the deadlines, so that we can make other arrangements.

Thanks!

-Eric

*These articles on Political Theory are completely optional and are not required reading. However, knowledge of the theories may be useful for your own intellectual pursuits. Think of the articles as a synopsis of an entire college semester, free of tuition and expensive books.*

Now for a while you’ve most likely been keeping up with the news, and this certainly is commendable for studious delegate. However, you may wish to consider the types of media which you consider.

I’m assuming here that CNN, BBC, NY Times, or many others are what make up the majority of your news sources. Generally, these papers are less biased, at least from the perspective of state control and influence. It is suggested that these sources are used for general facts. In fact, many state-run newspapers simply look at what is on CNN, modify it a little, and then publish it.

What then, is the purpose for state-run papers? And what is their value when it comes to research? The answer, surprisingly enough, is that they may be more important to policy analysis than more commonly accepted sources, for the following reasons:

• Propaganda Value- What is your State trying to convey to the world? For state-run newspapers, often times (but not always) public articles mirror private diplomatic overtures. States know that other world leaders do read their newspapers, so often times you can conclude what an ambassador might say simply from reading his country’s newspaper. Alternatively, you can also figure out what a state will not say or deny based on their newspaper.
• Alternate Set of Facts- Occasionally, States may dispute facts reported by the international press. For example, Iranian denials that the Holocaust occurred create an alternate reality that an ambassador would take to be true. Therefore, unlike what is reported by CNN, Iran may act differently in the context anything related to the Holocaust.
• Instructions for Bureaucrats- State-run newspapers are also an informal way of communicating to state workers. In this respect, if a Chinese environmental worker picks up a copy of the Peoples Daily (Renmin Ribao) and reads about a new government policy, they will follow this information in their work. State-run papers are not only a source of propaganda, but actually represent government hopes in the implementation of policy.
• Domestic Issues- If you confine yourself to CNN or BBC, you are unlikely to read about domestic issues in other countries, apart from the US or Europe. The only way to gain information about what is happening inside other nations is to read their papers (both state and privately run). Often times these will be translated into English and available online.

Pakistan’s “Dawn” Paper
India’s “Times of India” Paper
China’s State Run Paper “Peoples Daily”

Hi! This is the first of a regular series of news reports that might concern Crisis. You might also wish to check out this article on reading the news.

India and China to Promote the “Asian Way”- In a recent visit to Beijing, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed some fancy document outlining cooperation on a variety of fronts. It’s interesting to see the differences in coverage in both the Indian and Chinese newspapers (below). From just the way the headlines are worded, the Indian one seems to be far more anti-imperialistic and active, while the Chinese counterpart is markedly more reserved. A quick search of Pakistani papers will find little reference, other than a highlight of the “nuclear cooperation” portion.
Read More (Times of India)
Read More (Peoples Daily)

Taliban Still Active in Pakistan- While it seems to be a pretty low key arrangement between the Pakistani government and Taliban forces within Pakistan, we can learn a lot from “reading between the lines” here, especially on the status of the Taliban (and other anti-government forces). Note the way in which the local tribesmen act as a negotiator between the government and the Taliban. It’s also interesting how the agreement mentions prosecution under domestic Pakistani law. What does this say about Pakistan’s much vaunted assistance to the USA in the “War on Terror”? What does it reflect about the real political strength of the Pakistani government?
Read More (Dawn)

…Called guess the crisis event!

Over the course of the conference, new events will always be happening. Now the new, inexperienced delegate will sit there wide-eyed in shock, paralyzed by fear, as something totally off the radar happens. If two such crises occur, they develop schizophrenia (we’re no longer allowed to do three at a time, since the bills to BMUN for comatose delegates were getting too high).

But you’re not that type of delegate, right?

The truth is that it really isn’t that difficult to come up with three or four ideas on what might go wrong between three fundamentally different, neighboring nuclear powers. As your Chairs, we don’t sit around and make up random ideas. Instead, we look at two sources: political history and current political trends.

They say that history tends to repeat itself, and within variances, it’s more or less true. Ethnic or tribal conflicts, for instance, plague areas today just as they did thousands of years ago. Less specifically, the reasons for war between such ancient actors as Athens and Sparta might very well apply to any modern nation-state. Your Chairs have quite the passion for this sort of thing, and with any crisis event we come up with, you’re very likely to find similarities with previous events.

Another fun field that we work in is trying to divine the pushes and pulls of our current world geo-political order. These trends, unlike historical fact, are more difficult to identify. They may start as a popular rumor on the ground, mumblings in the press, or even something much less concrete. Statistics that have been stable for some time may shift, foreshadowing change on the horizon when people begin to react to the moving numbers. Or, most bluntly, state policy can be openly changed. No matter what, these factors are sure to shape the coming crises.

So feel free to play around with ideas, to dismiss things that seem unreasonable, to conduct research on what could be the future. To our credit, in a good portion of the cases for Crisis, the events that our Chairs come up with usually end up happening in the real world (one reason why we never let things come down to outright nuclear war). Keep this in mind, and you’ll be better off in committee.

I’ve always personally thought that the reason why Crisis was so entertaining was the “human” factor.  In other committees, you’re dealing with a literary topic, something you read about and study, but that’s about it.  It doesn’t speak back, have its own agenda, or any semblance of life.

Crisis, on the other hand, pits one group of delegates against another in a lively match of wits.  This creates a dynamic and exciting environment, one that forces delegates to push the boundaries of risk and creativity lest they be outdone by their competitors.  BMUN as a whole has tried to expand on this concept, and previous Security Council-General Assembly interactions were based off of the Crisis structure.

The three Cabinets that will be in this year’s Crisis are the Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani governments.  Each of these has their own blogs, at the right under the title “Blogroll”.  If delegates are going to discuss national topics and share their research, they ought to do it under their respective blogs.  Please keep in mind that anyone may access and view these blogs, so keep your top secret machinations off of them.

You may also have noticed that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) blog also appears under “Blogroll”.  This is because, in a way similar to last year’s Crisis Security Council (CSC), the UNSC will once again be acting in concert with Crisis.  So, not only will you need to carefully watch two other Cabinets, but you might find the United States or Russia breathing down your back should you step on too many toes.  All the more fun we say!

Hi! I suppose if you’re browsing this site, then it means you’ve gotten a spot as a delegate on Crisis Simulations. We’re glad to have you, and even happier that you’ve found this blog.

Crisis Simulations are a very different sort of committee than your average MUN experience, and delegates will be tested in different ways from what you’d normally expect. If you’re new to the entire “Crisis” type of committee, then I would highly encourage you to read both our topic synopsis as well as our “Introduction” page. Admittedly, Crisis Simulation is a bit more difficult for new delegates to grasp, and familiarizing yourself with some of the basics will let you get into the action all the more quickly.

That being said, Crisis type committees are without a doubt the most exciting bit of MUN there is. Whereas in a normal committee you would be dealing with static, unchanging issues such as “Malnutrition” or the such, Crisis deals with topics that are constantly changing, in part due to the actions that you will take. In Crisis, delegates have a real impact on what goes on in their imaginary world, and it’s that sort of satisfaction that brings delegates back year after year.

Our Chairs are also the only permanent staff on BMUN, and while other BMUN Chairs may float between many different committees, Crisis Chairs are generally here to stay. We have an excellent staff this year, whom I’m sure will have introductions up at a later date. Chairing the Pakistani Cabinet are Natalie Montano (my esteemed and lovely co-Head Chair) and Per Steenstrup (whom you may recall from Crisis Security Council last year). The Indian Cabinet is led by Brian Huang and Stephanie Perez. Evelyn Chiu and Catherine Choh will be heading the Chinese Cabinet. Jack Chai will be assisting in Command and Control (CnC) in our Control Room. Sadly this year, Mohammed Amir-Aghaee is on loan to the Historical Security Council, but hopefully we’ll be able to get him back as a notable guest speaker. We’re all a rather friendly sort, and feel free to approach any of us with questions or concerns about Crisis, BMUN, or Berkeley.

And before I forget, I’m the other Head Chair of Crisis, Eric Ching. You probably won’t see me too much around, as I’ll be cackling madly over a laptop as I try my best to respond to all your instructions and notes. I encourage you to contact me at . Otherwise, how will I ever get to know you?

At any rate, best of luck, and of course the obligatory “I’ll be looking forward to seeing you in March”!

-Eric Ching
Crisis Simulations Head Chair

But we’re still setting up our blog!

We promise to have a more fulfilling post by the Western New Year.

Thank you for your understanding!
-Eric Ching
Crisis Simulations Head Chair